저번 주 타임지에 천안문 사태 당시 중국공산당 총서기였던 자오지양이 그 당시를 회고하면서 녹음한 테이프를 외국으로 반출하는데 성공했다는 기사가 나왔다. 그리하여 이번에 출판된 책이 Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang 이다. 학생들의 시위에 대해 계엄선포하려는 당의 결정에 반대를 한 후에 모든 권력을 잃고 계속 집 안에 갇혀서 지내야만 했던 그였다. 천안문 사태 이후 20년이 지난 지금, 천안문은 중국에게 어떤 의미를 지니고 있을까. 자오지양은 회고록에서 천안문 사태는 당의 잘못된 결정이었고, 미래를 위해서는 민주주의로 나아가야한다고 말하고 있다. 타임지 기사(Tiananmen Ghosts : The secret memoir of a fallen Chinese leader)
그런데 중국인들은 과연 그렇게 생각하고 있을까? 중앙일보에 난기사(천안문 사태?20년 전 일일뿐...)를 보면 "천안문 사태에 대해서는 뚜렷한 기억이 없다"거나 "먹고 살기 바쁜 사람들은 그런 이야기 꺼내지도 않는다"라는 반응이 나온다. 작년 여름에 스탠포드에서 오신 Andrew Walder교수님은 중국에서 천안문 사태는 거의 있지도 않은 사건처럼 되어버렸다고 말씀하셨다. 심지어 중국근현대사를 공부하러 스탠포드로 유학온 중국학생이 천안문 사태에 대해 전혀 모르고 있을 정도였다고 하시니...;;; 역사를 모르는 것이 얼마나 섬뜩한 일인지 그 순간 '확'하고 느낀 것 같다.
천안문 사태에 대해 계속 생각하다 보니 월더 교수님이 그 때 내주신 과제 주제가 생각났다. '제 2의 천안문 사태가 일어날 가능성이 있는가? 자신의 답에 대한 근거를 대시오.' 중국에 내재된 정치 사회적 요소들이 너무 많아서 사실 일어날 수도 일어나지 않을 수도 있을 것 같다. 통신매체 발달로 민주주의에 대한 요구가 거세지고 있고, 빈부격차가 심해지면서 사회적 불만이 높아지고 있지만 또다른 한편으로는 경제성장 속에서 중국 청년층의 정치적 무관심이 확산되고 있는 상황이다. 어느때보다도 강력해지고 있는 중국의 민족주의 풍조도 당의 집권력을 공고히 하는 무시할 수 없는 요소다. 그렇지만 개인적으로는 중국 청년층의 정치적 무관심(또는 당에 대한 지지)은 기본적으로 경제성장에 기반을 두고 있기 때문에 성장이 꺾이거나 감소하는 그 순간에는 돌변할 가능성이 충분히 있을 것 같다. 또 급속도로 사회가 다원화되는 상황에서 일당독재를 유지하고자 하는 발상 자체가 기형적이어서 언젠가는 무너지고 말 것이라는 생각이 든다. 중국은 지금이라도 천안문 사태에 대해 공식적으로 대응하여 민주주의를 향한 걸음을 시작할 수 없을까?
작년 여름에 썼던 페이퍼(다시 보니 급하게 쓴 티가 팍팍ㅠㅠ)
“Black cats or white cats are OK, but what about old cats?” asked a poster in the May protests that led to the Tian’anmen crisis. The poster was turning an old saying of Deng Xiaoping against him, demanding political reform. Although the student movements of 1986 signaled a rise of intolerance, expressions of discontent toward the central leaders of the government were unprecedented. Almost two decades after Tian’anmen, people are debating on the possibility of another massive protest against the central government. However, accurate prediction is getting harder and harder due to the conflicting views and sentiments toward it.
One of the major factors that point to another Tian’anmen is the rising inequality since the economic reforms. The Gini coefficient which was a little over 3.0 in 1985 hopped to 4.5 in less than 20 years. Because China had been one of the most equal countries in the world, this sudden shift to an unequal country resulted in resentment toward the party for people who could not cope with the reforms. Also a lack of a rural welfare system left people further behind.
Urban areas are also facing similar problems. Especially in the state sector where restructuring and downsizing are inevitable the ‘iron rice bowl’ is broken and employment is no longer guaranteed. Fifty million jobs were cut in just a decade which was enough to fuel sporadic protests across the country. Also the privatization process of factories led workers to perceive their conflicts with private owners in terms of class division. Thus, arguments were framed in socialist views backed by ‘class consciousness’ and used as a weapon against the government because the government had never officially repudiated socialism. Unlike the sporadic protests mentioned above, these movements against privatization were quite organized as can be seen in the ZZPM factory case. The ZZPM movement leaders organized committees and tried to legitimize their struggle through institutionalized channels. This suggests that there is the potential for even more well organized and massive protests in the future.
This is not just the case for the uneducated or lower classes of society. As China introduced telecommunications technology into the country more and more educated students and middle class people are expressing their demands and views for political reform and freedom via the internet. Despite the government’s efforts to block these ‘subversive’ messages, they continue to circle the internet.
Even outside cyberspace ideological diversity is starting to challenge the one party rule system of China. Along with the Neo Maoists, Neo Conservatives and Neo Nationalists have also joined in the political discourse. Although the Neo Nationalists support a strong central government and call for a revival of nationalism, their criticisms imply that the leadership has responded ineffectively to internal and foreign challenges. As seen in the massive anti-Japan protests, if the government is unable to meet the nationalist demands it is possible for them to turn on the government.
However, the argument that another Tian’anmen is not likely also gains support. One of the reasons for this is because nationalism is rapidly rising throughout China in recent years. With annual economic growth rates over 10 percent in the past 20 years, a lot of Chinese people feel a swell of national pride and feel that China is returning to its position in the world as a great nation. The Belgrade bombing protests in 1999 that flamed throughout the world and the students’ efforts to ‘protect’ the Olympic torch in 2008 are good examples of the rising nationalism. Thus, even if people recognize the undemocratic flaws in the government they believe rapid political reform would undermine political stability and lead to a downfall of the country.
Another reason is that unlike the generation of 1989, the post 1989 generation is seen as materialistic, individualistic and consumer-oriented. So as long as economic growth persists the generation is likely to remain apathetic toward politics. This differs a lot from the 1989 generation especially with the ‘sent down youth’ who were disillusioned by the abject poverty in rural areas and started to question the party’s ways and authority. Even if there are critical students in the post 1989 generation the number is fairly small.
It is necessary to point out the differences between the Tian’anmen crisis and the crises of China today in order to be able to forecast another Tian’anmen. In Tian’anmen, although the main forces were made up of students, ordinary citizens showed sympathy and support and workers also joined in the protests later on. Therefore, students, workers and citizens alike shared united views against the central government (though their demands differed in the specifics) and were able to give the government a powerful blow. However with a rising sense of nationalism and pragmatic viewpoints in students today, protest forces are somewhat weaker than that of Tian’anmen, leaving only the discontent rural and urban workers to themselves.
On the other hand, the pragmatism of students could totally turn against the government. Because the students’ support basically lies in economic growth and not the party itself (students view the government as an organ that maintains political stability for economic growth), a decline in economic growth due to worldwide recession could make students turn their backs on the government and demand political change.
In conclusion, China’s current state is a volatile one which could erupt any moment with just the slightest change in inner or outer factors. Therefore in order to prevent another Tian’anmen the central government must take the initiative for political and legal reform to resolve rising problems and uncertainties in the country before it is too late.